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Abstract. Economic theories of managing renewable resources, such as ﬁsheries
and forestry, traditionally assume that individual harvesters are perfectly rational
and thus able to compute the harvesting strategy that maximizes their discounted
proﬁts. The current paper presents an alternative approach based on bounded
rationality and evolutionary mechanisms. It is assumed that individual harvesters
face a choice between two harvesting strategies. The evolution of the distribution
of strategies in the population is modeled through a replicator dynamics equation.
The latter captures the idea that strategies yielding above average proﬁts are
demanded more than strategies yielding below average proﬁts, so that the ﬁrst
type ends up accounting for a larger part in the population. From a mathematical
perspective, the combination of resource and evolutionary processes leads to
complex dynamics. The paper presents the existence and stability conditions
for each steady-state of the system and analyzes dynamic paths to the equilib-
rium. In addition, effects of changes in prices are analyzed. A main result of
the paper is that under certain conditions both strategies can survive in the long-run.
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1 Introduction
The management of renewable resources, such as ﬁsh and timber, is traditionally
studied within the neoclassical framework (Clark, 1976; Neher, 1990). In recent
years, the growing criticism of this framework and the renaissance of evolution-
ary ideas applied to economics have given rise to new theoretical and modeling
approaches in resource economics. Two features have been subject to particular
attention from evolutionary economists.
The ﬁrst feature is related to the assumption of unboundedly rational choice. A
standard result in resource economics is that the harvesting rate over time can be
computed bymaximizing the present value of individual proﬁts under the constraint
of resource dynamics. This implies that individual harvesters have perfect infor-
mation and possess the computational abilities to solve the optimization problem.
Nevertheless, this assumption has been refuted on empirical and methodological
grounds (Conlisk, 1996; Simon, 1962). In recent years, bounded rationality has
been blended within an evolutionary mechanism (Nelson and Winter, 1982). On
this view, human behavior is guided by a set of ‘routines’, deﬁned as rules of thumb
or repeated habits.Accordingly, when new strategies or technologies are introduced
on the market, ﬁrms tend to imitate the most successful one, or the one that yields
a ‘satisﬁcing’ level of proﬁts. Thus, imitation and adaptation play important roles
in individual choice. These notions are also relevant for the ﬁeld of environmental
economics (van den Bergh et al., 2000). Related concepts, namely adaptive man-
agement and learning, have been introduced into environment-economic models
(Holling, 1978; Walters, 1986).
The second feature is ‘representative agents’, which are common inmainstream
economics. In resource economics, for instance, it is often assumed that the ex-
ploitation of a resource by a group of harvesters in non-free access situations is
equivalent to a centrally planned economy (Levhari et al., 1981). According to
Kirman (1992), these models are inaccurate or even misleading. In reality, agents
can exhibit heterogeneous characteristics, interactions between which often lead
to ‘emergent’ patterns that cannot be easily predicted at the population level by
using representative agent models. In resource economics, the emergence of phe-
nomena such as sustainability and pollution has been studied by Jager et al. (2000)
within a multi-agent model, in which individuals are endowed with different be-
havioral characteristics. A similar type of model is used by Rouchier et al. (2001)
to study emergent dynamics caused by the interactions among herdsmen managing
a rangeland. In general, the use of such bottom-up approaches has strong impli-
cations for environmental policy. First, it emphasizes the role of self-regulation in
ecological-economic systems. Second, it limits the role of environmental policy to
interventions that aim at modifying the context in which agents interact. Through
self-regulation this can result in diverse macro level outcomes that are not always
predictable (Ostrom, 2000).
The current paper is a contribution to these new developments in economics
and environmental economics. The objective is to study the interactions among
a population of boundedly rational harvesters who compete for a single natural
resource, and the macro level patterns that emerge from these interactions. This
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will have implications for resource use and management. Agents have a limited
rationality in the sense that they are unable to compute the optimal level of effort,
i.e. the effort level that maximizes their proﬁts. Instead, they choose between two
predetermined harvesting strategies. Their acceptance of one strategy as opposed
to the other is guided by a simple rule: the harvesters tend to adopt the strategy
that yields above-average proﬁts. This supposes that agents receive imperfect in-
formation about strategies and proﬁts of other harvesters. Bounded rationality thus
enters the model in two ways: ﬁrst, by the non-optimizing behavior of the agents,
and second, by the assumption of imperfect information.
This type of behavior, harvesters facing a choice between two heterogeneous
strategies, corresponds to real-world situations. The ‘tuna war’ that involved French
and Spanish ﬁshermen in themid-90s in theGulf ofBiscay is a clear recent example.
The Spanish resorted to traditional ﬁshing gears, while the French used long drift
nets and pelagic dragging, resulting in different productivity rates. In addition to
technological characteristics, the harvesting strategies can also differwith respect to
the type of information structure used by the different groups. In NorthAmerica, for
instance, some groups of ﬁshermen regularly use Geographic Information Systems
to gather information on ﬁsh stocks, while other groups make use of less advanced
methods of information processing and exchange. Ostrom (1990, 2000) documents
cases of common-dilemmas, i.e. issues where individual interest conﬂicts with the
collective interest, in which harvesters realise higher productivity through various
cooperative strategies.
In our model, heterogeneity in strategies is expressed through different effort
levels between two (sub)groups of harvesters. The strategy with the highest effort
level can be associated with using a more productive technology or practices of in-
formation sharing and cooperative behavior. The latter interpretation is consistent
with a low-effort level strategy of ‘isolated harvesters’, i.e. those who do not coop-
erate or share information (about spatial and temporal features of the resource, such
as in ﬁsheries). Note that in our model, in contrast with resource games (Ostrom
et al., 1994), a cooperative strategy enhances productivity and thus leads to higher
harvest levels.
An approach that relates closely to the one developed in this paper is the analysis
of common-dilemmas within an evolutionary game theory framework by Sethi and
Somanathan (1996). They study the evolution of three strategies, namely ‘defect-
ing’, ‘cooperating’, and ‘enforcing’1 in the context of a population of harvesters
interacting in a common-pool resource game. In such a game, individual payoffs
are directly affected by the actions of the other players in terms of harvest levels
and punishment. The evolutionary process is described by a replicator dynamics
equation, which captures the idea that differential survival is proportional to the
relative performance value of each strategy, where performance is deﬁned in terms
of proﬁts. Sethi and Somanathan integrate replicator and resource dynamics within
a single framework and identify steady-states of the system, composed of only ‘de-
fectors’ or of coexisting ‘cooperators’ and ‘enforcers’. Their analysis conﬁrms that
1 An enforcer punishes defectors who do not act cooperatively.
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punishment can stimulate cooperation and is even necessary for solving common-
dilemmas issues through the spontaneous evolution of rules of thumb.
In dealing with the problem of selection of strategies by boundedly rational
agents, several questions arise. First, what is the motivation behind the selection
of one strategy over the other? In our model, selection is related to the perfor-
mance, deﬁned in terms of proﬁts, of each strategy over time. Agents imitate the
most successful strategy, while the adjustement speed at which harvesters switch
to the superior strategy reﬂects the imperfect diffusion of information. We resort
to a replicator dynamics equation to model the distribution of strategies in the
population.
Second, what are the factors or dynamics that inﬂuence the performance of
each strategy over time? Just like in Sethi and Somanathan’s model, we combine
replicator and resource dynamics. Nevertheless, in our case, individual payoffs
are not directly affected by the aggregate behavior of the other harvesters. Here
individual choice for one strategy over another affects the stock of the common-
pool resource, which in return determines individual’s payoffs. Hence, the behavior
of the group affects indirectly individual decisions by means of the resource stock.
In this sense, our model does not describe a strategic game between the economic
actors and is by deﬁnition applicable to larger groups of harvesters.
Finally, what will be the long run distribution of strategies in the population?
Here, we identify three evolutionary outcomes. In two cases, only one strategy
survives, while in a third case the two strategies coexist. The resource price appears
to be a possible instrument of environmental policy.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
identiﬁes the steady-states of the system. Section 4 presents the existence and
stability conditions for each equilibrium. Section 5 discusses the dynamic path to
the equilibrium using numerical illustrations. Section 6 presents the conclusions.
2 The model
We consider a system where a ﬁxed number m of individuals harvest a stock N
of a natural resource. The natural growth dynamics governing the resource are
described by a logistic equation. The stock is depleted by the aggregate harvest
over all individuals in the population H(N). Hence,
N˙ = rN
(
1 − N
K
)
− H(N). (1)
where r is the intrinsic growth rate of the resource and K is the carrying capacity.
We assume that the agents face a choice between two harvesting strategies.2 Each
strategy is deﬁned by a set of two parameters, namely an effort level Ei and an
extraction cost parameterCi, (i = 1, 2). In traditional resource economics, the level
of effort is the result of an optimization problem, whereas here the level of effort
is determined exogenously. The term harvesting effort has many interpretations in
2 We consider only two strategies to keep the model simple and tractable analytically. Obviously, a
larger number of strategies would result in more complex dynamics.
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resource economics. It can be measured by the amount of labor or capital employed
in harvesting, or by the type of technology used. It thus captures many different
aspects of heterogeneity found in resource harvesting. Differences in parameters
reﬂect then the idea that strategies differ with regard to acquiring information,
cooperation among agents, or use of technology. In the remainder of the paper, we
pose the assumption E1 > E2 without loss of generality, meaning that the ﬁrst
strategy i = 1 is more productive but also more resource intensive than the second
one.
In the present model, the harvest level hi of an agent using strategy i (i = 1, 2)
is similar to a linear production function with constant returns to scale in the effort
input and N as an exogeneous parameter:
hi(N) = EiN i = 1, 2. (2)
Thus, the proﬁts yielded by an agent using strategy i can be written as
πi = hi(N)[P − CiN+1 ] i = 1, 2. (3)
where P is the exogenous price. Hence, we assume that harvesters are price-taking,
i.e. we focus only on the supply side of the model. The unit cost function CiN+1 is
commonly used in resource economics, and more particularly in ﬁshery economics
(Bradley, 1970). It reﬂects the idea that, as the stock of the resource decreases, it
becomes more and more costly to exploit it.
In the remaining part of this paper, we aim to study how resource dynamics
affect the level of proﬁts for each strategy, and more particularly the ranking of
proﬁts between the two strategies, since it is this that determines the evolution of
strategies in the population. To do so, we assume along the remaining analysis that
the following holds:
E1C1 > E2C2. (4)
Note that the ranking of proﬁts is not affected under the conditionE1C1 < E2C2.3
From (3), it appears that unit costs are positively affected by the product EiCi.
Thus, posing E1C1 > E2C2 implies that the total costs of strategy 1 exceed the
total costs of strategy 2 for all N . This counterbalances the advantage of superior
revenues of strategy 1, which is the more productive strategy. Indeed, as N is more
and more depleted, total costs for strategy 1 increase more sharply than for strategy
2. As N keeps on decreasing, the difference between revenues and costs narrows
for both strategies and eventually the proﬁts of strategy 1 fall below the proﬁts
of strategy 2. Thus, assuming that (4) holds corresponds to the case in which the
outcome of the evolution of strategies can not be easily predicted without formal
analysis.
3 In this case, we have π1 > π2 for all N since:
π1 − π2 = PN(E1 − E2) − N
N + 1
(E1C1 − E2C2).
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At any point in time, the proportion of agents using strategy i = 1, 2 is repre-
sented by the share si[0; 1], where s1 + s2 = 1. Aggregate harvest can then be
expressed as
H(N) = ms1h1(N) + m(1 − s1)h2(N). (5)
The evolution of the proportion of individuals choosing strategy 1 is modeled
through a replicator dynamics4 equation written as follows:
s˙1 = s1(π1 − π¯), (6)
with π¯ = s1π1 + (1 − s1)π2 representing the average proﬁt in the population.
This equation captures the notion that a strategy yielding above (below) average
proﬁts increases (decreases) in share in the population. Two observations follow
from (6). First, the change in shares is a gradual process. Therefore, an underlying
assumption is that there must be a delay between observing that the other strategy is
more proﬁtable and adopting it. This can be interpreted as an element of imperfect
information. For example, a more successful strategymay be employed somewhere
outside the observation horizon of an agent. In brief, strategy changes are regarded
as a result from imperfect learning about t he performance of the other strategy, in
other words, as imitation. Time before switching to the superior strategy can also
be interpreted as an adjustment cost. Second, the replicator dynamics in (6) implies
that for s1(0) = 1 (s1(0) = 0), we have π¯ = π1 (π¯ = π2). In this case, the share s1
will remain constant over time. Since we aim to observe the evolution of strategies
in the population, these cases are of no interest for our analysis. Thus, we assume
that the population has an initial distribution characterized by 0 < s1(0) < 1.
For ease of interpretation, the general form of the replicator dynamics can be
rewritten as follows, since there are only two strategies:
s˙1 = s1(1 − s1)(π1 − π2). (7)
In (7), when the proﬁts of strategy 1 exceed the proﬁts of strategy 2, the change in
the proportion of individuals using strategy 1 is positive. Inversely, when π2 > π1,
then (1 − s1), i.e. the share of strategy 2, increases. Equations (1) and (7) describe
the full dynamic system. Through substitution of (2), (3) and (5) this reduces to

N˙ = rN
(
1 − NK
)− mN(s1E1 + (1 − s1)E2)
s˙1 = s1(1 − s1)N
[
P (E1 − E2) + E2C2−E1C1N+1
]
.
(8)
(9)
The structure of this system clearly shows that the dynamics of harvesting strate-
gies are linked to the dynamics of the resource. At all points in time, the level of
4 The choice of replicator dynamics as an evolutionary mechanism was motivated by its simple
analytical form, allowing the model to be solved analytically. Nevertheless, this modeling choice limits
the degree of heterogeneity that can be included in the model. Replicator dynamics describes changes in
(sub)populations represented by an aggregate variable or ‘strategy’, and is widely used in evolutionary
game theory. Some other evolutionary tools like multi-agent models, where each agent is modeled
individually, allow for amore extended treatment of heterogeneity, but at the cost of analytical tractability.
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Fig. 1. Graphical representation of the dynamic system
proﬁts yielded by each strategy is determined by the stock level, and conversely,
the resource level is determined by the distribution of harvesting strategies. The
following section identiﬁes the ﬁxed points of the system.
3 Identiﬁcation of the steady-states
The steady states of the dynamical system formed by (8) and (9) are situated at the
intersections of the nullclides N˙ = 0 and s˙1 = 0. We ﬁnd N˙ = 0 along the lines
N = 0 and s1 = f(N), given by
f(N) =
r(1 − NK ) − mE2
m(E1 − E2) , (10)
with f(0) = r−E2mm(E1−E2) , and f(N) = 0 for N = K(1 − mE2r ). Next, s˙1 = 0 for
N = 0, s1 = 0, s1 = 1, and N = E1C1−E2C2P (E1−E2) − 1. Figure 1 provides a graphical
representation of the system. The set of equilibria is composed of three intersection
points labelled A, B and C and of a set of equilibria D along the line N = 0. Note
that Figure 1 represents a special case in which the three equilibria A, B and C lie
within the feasible ranges for N and s1 i.e., N ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ s1 ≤ 1. Section 4 will
review the explicit existence conditions for each equilibrium.
Solving the system (8)–(9) gives the coordinates of the three equilibria A, B
and C and of the continuum of equilibria D.
A. (NA; s1A) with NA = K(1 − mE2r )
s1A = 0.
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Fig. 2. NB(P ) and s1B(P ) Fig. 3. Shift in NB due to a change in price
B. (NB ; s1B) with NB = E1C1−E2C2P (E1−E2) − 1
s1B =
P (E1−E2)[r(K+1)−mKE2]+r(E2C2−E1C1)
mKP (E1−E2)2 .
C. (NC ; s1C) with NC = K(1 − mE1r )
s1C = 1.
D. The set D of all points such that N = 0. The set D corresponds to a degenerate
equilibrium in which there is no harvesting activity at all. Accordingly, we will
exclude the set D from further analysis, since differences among strategies in this
set are irrelevant.
A brief look at the steady-states A, B and C shows that there are three possible
distributions of strategies over the population in the long run. In the A-equilibrium
only the least resource intensive strategy survives, meaning that ultimately all har-
vesters have adopted strategy 2. In the C-equilibrium, by contrast, strategy 1 is the
sole strategy that remains in the population. Remarkably, in the B-equilibrium both
strategies coexist in the long-run, meaning that competition between strategies does
not necessarily lead to the elimination of one of them.
Two central observations can be made about the B-equilibrium. First, the B-
equilibrium corresponds to a situation in which both strategies yield equal proﬁts.
Indeed, at N = NB the effort level differences cancel out against the costs. For
N < NB , the proﬁts of the least productive strategy 2 exceed the proﬁts of the
most productive one, strategy 1. Consequently, harvesters switch progressively to
strategy 2. Inversely, the ranking of proﬁts switches whenN increases beyondNB .
Then , forN > NB the proﬁts of strategy 1 exceed the proﬁts of strategy 2, leading
to a gradual increase in the share s1.
A second observation is that the position of the B-equilibrium is affected by
changes in the price variable. From the coordinates of B, it can be seen that NB
(s1B) is a decreasing (increasing) function of P . Effects of a positive shift in the
price P are depicted in Figure 2 and 3.
A positive change in price from P1 to P2 corresponds to a shift to the left of the
line N = NB in Figure 3. This results into a lower stock level and a higher share
of harvesters using the most productive strategy 1 at the B-equilibrium.
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4 Existence and stability conditions
4.1 Existence conditions
This section speciﬁes conditions for the existence of each equilibrium.
– Existence of the A-equilibrium.
A necessary condition for the existence of the A-equilibrium is NA > 0. This
holds if and only if r > mE2. In other words, the intrinsic growth rate of the
resource must exceed the total harvest rate when the whole population uses the
least resource intensive strategy, namely strategy 2.
Note that for r ≤ mE2, there is complete exhaustion of the resource at all
equilibria, meaning that unsustainability is inevitable.
– Existence of the C-equilibrium
A necessary condition for the existence of the C-equilibrium is NC > 0. This
holds if and only if r > mE1. In other words, the intrinsic rate of growth of the
resource is larger than the total harvest rate when all harvesters use the most
intensive strategy, namely strategy 1.
Note that r ≤ mE1 is a necessary condition for possible exhaustion of the
resource. It implies that the resource stock at C is negative. Nevertheless, sus-
tainability can be achieved at the remainder equilibria A and B. In the sequel
of the paper, we exclude the possibility of resource exhaustion. Therefore, we
pose an additional assumption, namely:
r > mE1. (11)
– Existence of the B-equilibrium.
Necessary conditions for the existence of the B-equilibrium are NB > 0 and
0 ≤ s1B ≤ 1. The ﬁrst condition is satisﬁed whenever
P <
E1C1 − E2C2
E1 − E2 . (12)
The second condition 0 ≤ s1B ≤ 1 implies that the price P must be set within
a speciﬁc range, namely
P ∗ < P < P ∗∗, (13)
where P ∗ and P ∗∗ are deﬁned as follows:
P ∗ =
r(E1C1 − E2C2)
[r(K + 1) − mKE2](E1 − E2) , (14)
P ∗∗ =
r(E1C1 − E2C2)
[r(K + 1) − mKE1](E1 − E2) . (15)
Note that for P = P ∗ (P = P ∗∗), the B-equilibrium corresponds exactly to the
steady-stateA (C). Under these equality conditions only one strategy survives in
the long-run. In addition, it may be noted that, since we abstract from resource
exhaustion, i.e. (11) holds, then both prices P ∗ and P ∗∗ are positive and satisfy
condition (12), so that (13) is a sufﬁcient condition for the existence of the
B-equilibrium. In brief, the existence condition for B is fully given by (13),
which is equivalent of saying that NB must be located between NA and NC .
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In conclusion, depending on the parameter conditions, the model may display
either one unique equilibrium or multiple equilibria.
4.2 Stability results
Figure 1 provides a qualitative framework through which to analyze the global
stability properties of the system. The arrows indicate the direction of movement
of partial derivatives of N and s1 with N˙ < 0 for s1 > f(N), and s˙1 < 0 for
N < NB . In the following, we present the global stability results corresponding to
each equilibrium point.
Proposition 1. Global stability of the A-equilibrium
The equilibrium A is globally asymptotically stable if P ≤ P ∗ and r > mE2.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Proposition 1 tells us that the dynamic process drives the strategy 1 out of the
population such that, in the long-run, only strategy 2 survives. Note that if the
condition r > mE2 is not satisﬁed, then NA < 0, and theA-equilibrium cannot be
reached.
For A to be globally stable, we must have P < P ∗. As shown in Section 3,
the value of the price affects the position of the B-equilibrium. Thus P < P ∗
corresponds to the condition NB > NA, meaning that the B-equilibrium is located
on the right of the steady-state A in Figure 1 and the conditions for existence of
B are not satisﬁed. In this situation, both equilibria A and C are located on the
left of B, where the proﬁts of strategy 2 exceed the proﬁts of strategy 1. The only
stable equilibrium is thus the steady-stateA, at which all harvesters have ultimately
adopted strategy 2. Thus, as soon as the resource level is depleted beyond NB , the
dynamic system converges to A.
Proposition 2. Global stability of the C-equilibrium
The equilibrium C is globally asymptotically stable if P ≥ P ∗∗ and r > mE1.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
In this case, the dynamical process drives strategy 2 out of the population such that,
in the long-run, only strategy 1 survives. If the condition r > mE1 is not satisﬁed,
then NC < 0 and the C-equilibrium cannot be reached.
The condition P > P ∗∗ implies NB < NC , meaning that the B-equilibrium is
located on the left of the steady-state C in Figure 1. In this situation, both equilibria
A and C are on the right of NB , where the proﬁts of strategy 1 exceed the proﬁts
of strategy 2. Thus, all harvesters will progressively switch to strategy 1, meaning
that the C-equilibrium is the only asymptotically stable equilibrium.
Proposition 3. Global stability of the B-equilibrium
The equilibriumB is globally asymptotically stable if it exists. For a price far enough
from P ∗ and P ∗∗, the trajectory of the dynamical system spirals inward towards
the point B.
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Fig. 4. Trajectory with P = 1
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
When the value ofP lies outside the range deﬁned byP ∗ andP ∗∗, theB-equilibrium
cannot be reached. When B exists, the trajectory is a stable focus that converges
to B. Note that there are values of P very close to P ∗ and P ∗∗ for which there is
no spiralling around B (see Appendix A.3). Fluctuations around B are caused by
alterations in the ranking of proﬁts. These occur whenever the dynamical process
crosses the line N = NB . Asymptotic stability of B is illustrated in more details in
Section 5.
5 Dynamic paths to the equilibrium: Numerical illustration
In this section, we provide an illustration of stability at the B-equilibrium.As stated
earlier, in this case both strategies coexist in the long run.The following analysis can
then be easily transposed to stability at the equilibriaA and C.We assumeC1 > C2,
so that the most productive strategy exhibits higher costs. We ﬁx the parameters
as follows: E1 = 0.7, E2 = 0.2, C1 = 15, C2 = 10, r = 8, K = 50, m = 10,
N(0) = 50. We choose, arbitrarily, to start with s1(0) = 0.4 and s2(0) = 0.6,
although the analysis could be conducted for any initial share distribution. Note
that P ∗ = 0.44 and P ∗∗ = 2.34, so we ﬁx P = 1 implying that the existence
condition for B is satisﬁed. In this case, B is globally asymptotically stable as stated
in Proposition 3. The coordinates of the ﬁxed points are A(37.5; 0), B(16; 0.68),
C(6.25; 1) . The existence conditions are satisﬁed for all equilibria and the dynamic
process converges towards the point B as shown in Figure 4.
To provide a better understanding of the processes involved, Figure 5 presents
the evolution over time of the stock of resource, the share s1 and the proﬁts yielded
by both strategies.
In Figure 5, it may be observed that s1 ﬁrst increases over time. Simultaneously,
N decreases, since an increasing number of harvesters progressively adopts strategy
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Fig. 5. Evolution of N , s1, π1, π2, and π¯
1. When the resource level reaches NB = 16, the share s1 starts decreasing. This
is due to the fact that at NB the ranking of proﬁts switches alternatively and the
proﬁts yielded by strategy 1 become smaller than the proﬁts yielded by strategy
2, as it can be seen on the lower graph of Figure 5. Consequently, s1 continues to
decrease as long as π2 > π1. Nevertheless, there is a point at which the dynamic
trajectory crosses the line s1 = f(N) in Figure 4. When the trajectory goes below
the line s1 = f(N), we have N˙ > 0, meaning that the resource starts to replenish
itself. Thus, the resource stock increases until reaching NB = 16. At that point,
the ranking of proﬁts switches again as shown on the bottom part of Figure 5, and
s1 starts increasing one more time. The process continues and forms a spiral that
converges toward the point B where the process ends.
Note that, in this example, we assume that the harvesters cannot exit the industry
even when facing negative proﬁts. This assumption is realistic since ﬁsheries, for
instance, are characterized by ease of entry but difﬁculty of exit. When prices or
yields drop, there are no alternative opportunities for using the vessels. Thus, the
managers often remain in the ﬁshery as long as they are able to cover their direct
operating costs. Barriers to exit can also be interpreted as the results of sunk costs
in combination with bounded rationality.
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In addition, it can be noted that for each strategy there is a speciﬁc N below
which proﬁts become negative.Whether the dynamic process reaches this threshold
or not depends on the initial proportion of high harvesters in the population. Indeed,
when the population is initially composed of very few high harvesters, subsequent
harvests remain low and the stock level is likely to stay above the threshold level.
By contrast, when the population is initially composed of a large number of high
harve sters, the resource stock is immediately harvested beyond the threshold level
below which proﬁts become negative.
6 Discussion and conclusion
The current paper is a contribution to the literature on evolutionary economics
applied to environmental issues. Two features make the model analyzed innovative.
First, in the spirit of evolutionary economics theories, we considered boundedly
rational agents. Imitation is a central feature of the model and can be seen as
imperfect learning, since we assumed that information about successful strategies
diffuses imperfectly. Harvesters in our model must evaluate the performance of
their strategy at each point in time, and may then decide to switch to a superior
strategy. Superiority is not ﬁxed but changes over time, inﬂuenced by the resource
stock and the distribution of strategies in the population.
Second, the model combines interactive resource and replicator dynamics in
a single framework. The evolution of harvesting strategies modiﬁes the level of
the resource stock. Inversely, changes in resource levels affect the proﬁts and thus
the evolution of economic activities. Individual proﬁts are solely affected by the
resource stock level, and the latter is directly linked to aggregate harvest.
Our analysis identiﬁes three evolutionary outcomes or, in other words, three
possible conﬁgurations of the ﬁnal population state. In two cases, the whole pop-
ulation adopts a unique strategy, either high or low effort. In the third case, the
population of harvesters is distributed between the two strategies. We showed how
the price of output affects existence and discussed the stability of each of those
outcomes.
In our model, we can interpret the price as an instrument of environmental
policy. A price set too low or too high will ultimately result in the dominance of
one strategy; a mid-range price allows for the coexistence of the two strategies. An
increase in price causes more and more harvesters to switch to the more productive
strategy, namely strategy 1. Recall that, in the model, high effort harvesters are
penalized by high unit costs, so that there is a certain level of the resource stock at
which the proﬁts of str ategy 1 become smaller than the proﬁts of strategy 2. Thus,
increasing the price results in lowering the threshold resource stock below which
strategy 1 looses its advantage in terms of proﬁts. The price can thus be regarded
as a contextual variable. Changing the context in which agents interact disturbs the
equilibrium and can result in a different evolutionary outcome. Nevertheless, other
variables, affecting resource parameters, for instance, may also play this role and
lead to similar results.
Which equilibrium is desirable in the long-run depends upon policy objectives.
As stated, the achievement of sustainability is related to parameter settings. If the
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growth rate of the resource is below the total harvest rate when thewhole population
uses the least resource intensive strategy 2, then unsustainability is inevitable. In
all other cases, the possibility of exhaustion of the system depends on existence
conditions. In terms of resource conservation, the point A is the equilibrium in
which the highest resource level can be achieved in the long run. This makes sense
intuitively since at A there are no harvesters using the highly resource intensive
strategy. Finally, whenever policy aims at preserving diversity of strategies, the
B-equilibrium is the most desirable outcome since, at B, there is coexistence of
the two competing strategies. Preserving a diversity of harvesting strategies may
be relevant to assure adaptive ﬂexibility in the face of system uncertainty, or more
simply to conserve knowledge in the system. In addition, heterogeneity may be
desirable for social or political reasons.When applied to ﬁsheries, for instance, this
model shows that cohabitation is possible between artisanal and industrial ﬁsheries
on the same ﬁshing grounds.
Appendix A – Proof of global stability results
Appendix A.1: Proof of Proposition 1
In Figure 1, the arrows indicate the signs of the derivatives: s˙1 is positive (negative)
for N > NB (N < NB). In addition, N˙ is positive (negative) for all points below
(above) the curve s1 = f(N) deﬁned in (10). In the following sections, we present
the global stability results that correspond to each equilibrium.
Consider the situation NB≥NA as depicted in Figure 6. For N>NB , s1 in-
creases monotonically, and N decreases since N>NB corresponds to a point lo-
cated above the curve s1=f(N). However, the increase of s1 cannot be maintained
until s1=1. This can be seen by solving the differential equation for s˙1,
s˙1 = s1(1 − s1)N
[
P (E1 − E2) + E2C2 − E1C1
N + 1
]
, (A-1)
which can be rewritten as:
s˙1 = as1(1 − s1), (A-2)
where a is a constant. The solution of the differential equation is
s1(t) =
1(
1
s1(0)
− 1
)
e−at + 1
. (A-3)
Note that s1(t) → 1 requires t → ∞. In other words, s1 will never reach the value
s1 = 1. This implies that N will fall below NB before s1 reaches 1, after which s1
starts decreasing.
In a ﬁrst step, N continues to decrease until s1 passes below the curve s1 =
f(N). Note that if the trajectory were to reach s1 = 1 or s1 = 0, the value of s1
would remain constant over time.
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Fig. 6. Global stability of the A-equilibrium
In addition, the dynamical system cannot reach N = 0 as long as the condition
r > mE1 holds. The growth rate of the resource is expressed as:
N˙
N
= −rN
K
− ms1(E1 − E2) + r − mE2. (A-4)
Indeed, r > mE1 implies that N˙N is increasing for all N > 0 and 0 ≤ s1 ≤ 1. Note
that, whenever r ≤ mE1, N˙N decreases for N close to 0 and s1 close to 1, meaning
that the process would ultimately reach N = 0.
In a second step, the trajectory crosses s1 = f(N) such that N increases and
s1 decreases until reaching A. The process ends in A where s1 = 0.
Appendix A.2: Proof of Proposition 2
Consider the case NB ≤ NC as depicted in Figure 7. For N < NB , s1 decreases.
Nevertheless, s1 cannot reach s1 = 0. Indeed, according to the equation (A-3),
s1(t) → 0 requires t → ∞. As N < NB corresponds to a point below the curve
s1 = f(N),N increases.WhenN reaches the stock levelNB , s1 starts increasing,
and accordingly when s1 moves above the curve s1 = f(N), N starts decreasing.
Ultimately, s1 increases monotonically until reaching the equilibrium C where
s1 = 1. The process approaches the point C asymptotically to the line s1 = 1 and
ends in C where s1 = 1.
Appendix A.3: Proof of Proposition 3
When NB is located between NC and NA as depicted in Figure 8, the trajectory
follows a counter-clockwise move. As stated above, s1 will increase (decrease)
without ever reaching s1 = 1 (s1 = 0), and similarly N will decrease without ever
reaching N = 0 and a continuous increase in N cannot be maintained over time,
since once N goes beyond the curve s1 = f(N) it starts decreasing again.
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Fig. 7. Global stability of the C-equilibrium
Local stability analysis shows that there exists a neighborhood near B in which
the trajectory is a spiral.
To prove that the point B is a locally stable focus, or in other words that the
dynamics may exhibit a spiralling pattern when converging to B, we need to show
that the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix are complex conjugates and that, in
addition, the real parts are negative (Feichtinger et al., 1994). The Jacobian matrix
of the linearized system (8)–(9) has the form
J =
(
∂N˙
∂N
∂N˙
∂s1
∂s˙1
∂N
∂s˙1
∂s1
)
. (A-5)
Evaluated at B, the Jacobian becomes
J =
(
−rNBK −αmNB
s1B(1 − s1B)NB α2P 2β 0
)
, (A-6)
where we deﬁne α = E1 −E2 and β = E1C1 −E2C2. We observe a stable focus
whenever for the following matrix J = ( a bc 0 ), the conditions a2 + 4bc < 0 and
a < 0 are satisﬁed. For the Jacobian evaluated at the point B, the ﬁrst condition is
equivalent to:
r2N2B
K2
− 4αmNBs1B(1 − s1B)NB α
2P 2
β
< 0. (A-7)
After substitution and simpliﬁcation, the condition (A-7) becomes:
4(NA − NB)(NB − NC)P
2α
mβ
> 1. (A-8)
The prices P , P ∗ and P ∗∗ can be written as follows:
P = βα(NB+1) , P
∗ = βα(NA+1) , P
∗∗ = βα(NC+1) .
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Fig. 8. Global stability of the B-equilibrium
The condition (A-8) can be expressed as:
−4 β
αm
(
P
P ∗
− 1)( P
P ∗∗
− 1) > 1. (A-9)
Recall that for E1 > E2, we have P ∗ < P < P ∗∗. Thus, for P close to P ∗ or
P close to P ∗∗, the inequality (A-9) does not hold. Finally, the second condition
a < 0 is veriﬁed since −rNBK < 0 for NB > 0.
Having proved that the B-equilibrium is locally stable, we now prove that B is
globally stable by ruling out the possibility of a limit cycle using Dulac’s criterion
(Strogatz, 1994):
Dulac’s criterion: Let x˙ = f(x) be a continuously differentiable 2-dimen-
sional system deﬁned on a simple connected subset R of the plane. If there
exists a continuously differentiable, real-valued function g(x) such that the
expression ∇ · (gx˙) = ∂gf1∂x1 +
∂gf2
∂x2
has one sign throughout R, then there
are no closed orbits lying entirely in R.
Let g(N, s1) = 1s1(1−s1) , then
∇ · (gx˙) = ∂
∂s1
(gs˙1) +
∂
∂N
(gN˙)
=
∂
∂s1
(
P (E1 − E2) − E1C1 − E2C2
N + 1
)
+
∂
∂N
(
r(1 − NK ) − m(s1E1 + (1 − s1)E2)
s1(1 − s1)
)
= − r/K
s1(1 − s1)
< 0.
Since the region deﬁned by N > 0 and 0 < s1 < 1 is connected and g, s˙1 and N˙
satisfy the required smoothness conditions, Dulac’s criterion implies that there are
no limit cycles in the deﬁned region.
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In conclusion, B is globally stable for parameter values such that P ∗ < P <
P ∗∗ hold, and all trajectories converge to the B-equilibrium as t → ∞.
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